WASHINGTON -- Germany's recent decision to summon the Chinese ambassador following reports that Russian soldiers may have been trained in China has renewed scrutiny of Beijing's support for Moscow's war against Ukraine.

For Christopher Walker, vice president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), the reported training should not be viewed as an isolated development. Rather, he argues, it reflects a broader pattern of cooperation among authoritarian governments that increasingly work together across diplomatic, economic, military and information domains, even without a formal alliance.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Walker discusses China's support for Russia's war effort, the evolving relationships among Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, and why democracies need a sustained, long-term strategy to compete with authoritarian powers.

RFE/RL: Germany has summoned the Chinese ambassador over intelligence reports that Beijing may have trained Russian soldiers. Does this represent a significant new development?

Christopher Walker: I think it's fair to say that China has afforded the Russian war effort in Ukraine systematic backing, and so it probably shouldn't come as such a huge surprise that the Chinese authorities apparently have elected to provide support of this kind to the Russian war effort. As other observers have noted, China's support really has been pivotal to Russia's war effort.

RFE/RL: Does Beijing's role now extend well beyond diplomatic support to becoming an essential economic and logistical partner for Moscow?

Walker: I think China has tried to have it both ways by signaling through its information and propaganda channels that it seeks to operate as an honest broker or as some sort of bystander, but its actions and support betray that idea, both in terms of this latest news relating to the apparent support for Russian soldiers who were trained and then went on to fight in Ukraine, but also in economic terms, in the provision of spare parts, diplomatic backing, and information and propaganda support.

This is, in a sense, part of a package of support that China has been providing to Russia effectively since the full-scale attack on Ukraine began [in February 2022]. Moreover, the relationship that has evolved between Russia and China dates back even further. One could argue to Xi Jinping's arrival as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and other top leadership positions in 2012 and Vladimir Putin's return to the Russian presidency around the same time.

Over time, they forged a very close relationship... They have met quite possibly up to about 70 times, either in person or virtually, since Putin returned to office and Xi Jinping assumed the top leadership position in China. They really have reached what we've described as a shared consciousness in the way they approach the wider world.

RFE/RL: A recent CEPA report examines the evolving relationship between Russia, China, and Iran. To what extent have these governments developed a coordinated strategic partnership, and how does that affect the US-led alliance system?