Although there appear to be some changes coming to Illinois employment laws this year (amendments that have passed by the Illinois Legislature and await the Governor’s signature), likely because it is an election year, none of the changes should cause too much consternation for Illinois employers, particularly when compared to some of the changes that were proposed but which did not pass, which we summarize at the end. We have separately reported on the new Illinois Menopause Equity and Care Act. We will continue to monitor these bills as they await enactment and monitor for any additional changes that could still occur later in 2026.

Many Illinois Employers to be Required to Pay for Jury Duty Service; Questions Loom

On May 26, 2026, the Illinois Legislature passed an amendment to the Jury Act under HB4844. The bill is expected to be sent to Governor Pritzker for signature. The amendment would require all employers with more than 25 employees to compensate employees at their “regular rate of pay for the time that the employee served on jury duty.” There is no limit on the number of days of jury duty service for which employees must be paid. The timing of when the new requirement would go into effect will depend on when (if) the Governor signs the bill. We will update this article when/if that happens.

The amendment does not specify if the employer only needs to compensate the employee for the time spent on jury duty that the employee was scheduled to work or whether the compensation must be for any hours on jury duty regardless of the employee’s actual work schedule. Section 4.1(a) of the Jury Act states that an employer cannot deny an employee who is working a night shift the necessary time off and cannot make the employee both serve on a jury and work the night shift. This section, therefore, would seemingly imply that an employer would need to give a night shift employee the time off to serve on jury duty and also compensate for that time. On the other hand, nothing in the Jury Act references part-time employment and therefore does not answer whether an employee who works part time during the week needs to be compensated for the entire time the employee is on jury duty even if that would be the equivalent of full-time work. The plain language would suggest that perhaps the employer would need to pay for the entire time on jury duty since the amendment states that the compensation is “for time that the employee served on jury duty” without qualification. If this were the case, however, a part-time employee could potentially also receive a double payment if he is working two part-time jobs for employers with more than 25 employees and both were to pay for the entire time the employee served regardless of the number of scheduled hours. There is likewise no answer to the question of whether an employee who only works weekends would also have to be compensated for the time served on a jury (which will nearly always and only be on weekdays). Thus, at this time, without further amendment, it is impossible to determine legislative intent as it pertains to part-time employees and employees who do not work fully weekday and daytime schedules of any length. The amendment is also silent on whether employers can require employees to turn over their juror pay to employers when they are being compensated. We presume that if an employer has a written policy informing employees of such a requirement that this will be acceptable and avoid double payment to the employee.

If signed into law, Illinois would join nine other states that require employers to pay wages to some or all employees who are called to jury duty, including Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Washington DC, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, and Tennessee. (The threshold number of employees and the number of days of required pay varies in the states on this list.) Miami-Dade and Broward Counties in Florida also require pay up to 5 days.

Illinois Human Rights Act Amendment Would Protect Against Disparate Impact Discrimination

On June 1, 2026, the Illinois Legislature passed SB3777, an amendment to the Illinois Human Rights Act. If signed by Governor Pritzker, the amendment would codify a protection that has long been enjoyed by all U.S. employees, until recently. Specifically, SB3777 provides that it is a civil rights violation for any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to use “criteria or methods” in any act as set forth in section 2-102 (e.g. hiring, promotion, discipline, termination, etc.) that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination on the basis of unlawful discrimination, citizenship status, family responsibilities, work authorization status, arrest record, or conviction record. This amendment appears to be a direct response to the EEOC’s new policies under the Trump Administration, which largely eliminated enforcement of “disparate impact” claims. Under the Illinois amendment, such criteria or methods will be considered unlawful unless the employer can demonstrate that the criteria or methods are job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity, or if the employer demonstrates the business necessity but the employee demonstrates that the business necessity could be served by another employment practice that has a less discriminatory effect.

Thus, under this Illinois amendment, the burden will fall on employers to prove the need for the particular policy (i.e. that it was job-related and consistent with business necessity) and effectively to also prove that there was no better way to achieve that need with a less discriminatory policy. On a federal level, under the EEOC’s new guidelines, as recently approved by a Department of Justice opinion letter, if an employee wishes to prove discrimination on a disparate impact theory, the burden remains with the employee to show that a specific practice directly caused the unequal outcomes, and they must also identify another approach that would be equally effective for employers but would result in fewer unequal outcomes.

The Illinois amendment defines “criteria or methods” as “practices, policies, and groups of practices or policies that may have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination prohibited under this Act [the Human Rights Act].” Of note, this definition references policies that “may have” a discriminatory effect, not those that actually do or did have a discriminatory effect. Thus, a policy that could merely theoretically discriminate will seemingly be found to fit the definition under the Act.

Employers with employees in Illinois will need to review their policies to ensure that they do not have a disparate impact based on a protected class or else have a very strong justification for the policy with no other reasonable way to achieve the result. Realistically, nothing is changing for Illinois employers as “disparate impact” has long been recognized form of discrimination. Now, it will be specifically stated so that it is widely known that the federal government’s lack of recognition of disparate impact will not be the law in Illinois.